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ARTICLE
ALLOWING WHISTLEBLOWERS TO COPY COMPANY
DOCUMENTS TO FILE QUI TAM COMPLAINTS UNDER
THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT WHEN REPORTING MEDICARE
FRAUD
Joel D. Hesch†

††

ABSTRACT
The qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, which pay whistleblower
rewards of up to 30% of the funds recovered back, have become the
government’s most powerful tool in combating rising fraud under the
Medicare program. Today, 95% of all Medicare fraud recoveries are the result
of whistleblowers filing qui tam lawsuits. Reporting fraud is most effective
when whistleblowers provide the government with documents supporting
fraud allegations. The Article argues that a strong public policy flowing from
several federal statutes and regulations allows employees to copy company
documents and use them to file qui tam lawsuits notwithstanding any
company policy or contract provision prohibiting employees from disclosing
company documents. The Article also suggests amendments to the False
Claims Act and Medicare program codifying this strong public policy.
I. INTRODUCTION
Medicare costs are exploding. To compound matters, Medicare
reimbursement claims are ripe with fraud. The False Claims Act (FCA) has
become the federal government's primary tool for combating Medicare
fraud.1 Under the FCA, a defendant must pay triple damages for falsely
† Joel D. Hesch is a Professor of Law, Liberty University School of Law; J.D., The
Catholic University of America, 1988. From 1990 through mid-2006, Mr. Hesch was a Trial
Attorney with the Civil Fraud Section of the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., which
is the office responsible for nationwide administration of the qui tam provisions of the False
Claims Act (FCA). The author handled FCA and qui tam cases throughout the nation in many
different circuits, including the trial aspects of Rockwell Int'l Corp. v. United States, 549 U.S.
457 (2007). He has authored two books, four amicus briefs before the U.S. Supreme Court,
and many law review articles on the False Claims Act.
†† Mr. Hesch extends a special note of thanks to his research assistant, Jillianne Engen
(J.D. 2020), who provided valuable assistance in researching and writing this article.
1. Avco Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 884 F.2d 621, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“The False
Claims Act is the government's primary litigative tool for the recovery of losses sustained as
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claiming reimbursement from Medicare or for knowingly retaining Medicare
overpayments.2 What makes the FCA most successful is its unique approach
of enlisting whistleblowers through qui tam3 provisions and paying them a
portion of the recovery.4 Because Medicare fraud is the lion’s share of all
fraud against the government, it is important to understand and correctly
apply the modern FCA’s qui tam provisions to this sector.
Section I introduces the issues. Section II outlines the scope of Medicare
fraud and the need for whistleblowers. Section III discusses the qui tam filing
requirements and anti-retaliation provisions. Section IV analyzes the public
policy considerations associated with the propriety of employees copying
documents when reporting Medicare fraud. It includes a discussion of four
existing federal statutes and regulations that prohibit employers in general
from restricting employees from reporting fraud against the government,
which establishes a strong public policy against restricting employees from
using company documents when reporting Medicare fraud. Therefore, this
Article argues that courts should find that there exists a strong public policy
exception in the Medicare context that operates to void any contract
provision restricting employees from providing documents to the
government (or counsel in anticipation of filing a qui tam lawsuit) when
reporting Medicare fraud. Similarly, courts should dismiss any claim by an
employer against an employee arising from the use of documents in reporting
Medicare fraud. Section V proposes that Congress should amend the FCA
both to prohibit, under statutory penalty, such contract provisions and to
render them void. That would place the FCA whistleblower protections on
an equal footing with whistleblowers protected under existing SEC rules. It
also proposes that Congress mandate, as a condition of participating in
Medicare, that providers not include in any handbook, policy, contract, or
severance agreement any restrictions on using company documents when
reporting Medicare fraud, similar to existing Department of Defense (DOD)
regulations. It’s time that the FCA and Medicare participation rules provide

the result of fraud against the government.”). The FCA is also the chief enforcement tool for
fraud under all other federal programs. Although this Article focuses on Medicare fraud, the
same principles apply equally to fraud under every federal program.
2. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2017).
3. “The term ‘qui tam’ is ‘short for the Latin phrase qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
se ipso in hac parte sequitur, which means “who pursues this action on our Lord the King's
behalf as well as his own.”’” Joel D. Hesch, Restating the “Original Source Exception” to the
False Claims Act’s “Public Disclosure Bar”, 1 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 111, 112 n.6 (2006) (quoting
Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 769 n.1 (2000)).
4. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273 and
codified at 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729-3733 (2017).
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the protections already existing for whistleblowers reporting military fraud
and SEC violations.
II. THE SCOPE OF MEDICARE FRAUD
Federal healthcare spending is on the rise and, unfortunately, so is
Medicare fraud. Congress has discovered that the best tool for combating
Medicare fraud is empowering whistleblowers and paying them a share of the
recovery. This section outlines the extent of Medicare fraud and the need for
whistleblowers.
A. The Extent of Medicare Fraud
In 2017, Medicare gross spending grew to $708 billion, up from $460
billion ten years earlier (in 2008).5 In addition, in 2017, the federal portion of
Medicaid spending was $492 billion,6 for a combined total of $1.2 trillion in
federal Medicare and Medicaid spending. Medicare spending is projected to
grow at an annual rate of 7.4% over the next decade and Medicaid at a rate of
5.8%.7 By 2023, Medicare spending alone will likely top $1 trillion, with
another projected $600 billion in Medicaid spending. Thus, combined
Medicare and Medicaid (collectively hereinafter Medicare) spending is set to
eclipse $1.5 trillion a year.8
As if the amount of Medicare spending were not frightening enough, an
estimated 10 percent of all claims submitted to Medicare are fraudulent.9 At
that fraud rate, in 2018 alone, the federal government would have lost $100
billion in undetected Medicare fraud.10

5. Government
Spending
Details,
USGOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM,
https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/year_spending_2017USbn_XXbs7n_10
(last
visited Feb. 3, 2019), and accompanying charts.
6. Id.
7. See CMS Office of the Actuary Releases 2017–2026 Projections of National Health
Expenditures, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. NEWS ROOM (Feb. 14, 2018),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/press-releases/cms-office-actuary-releases-2017-2026projections-national-health-expenditures.
8. See supra note 5. The chart for the 2023 projections is located at Government Spending
USGOVERNMENTSPENDING.COM,
Details,
https://www.usgovernmentspending.com/year_spending_2023USbn_20bs7n_10#usgs302
(last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
9. Joel D. Hesch, Restating the “Original Source Exception” to the False Claims Act’s
“Public Disclosure Bar” in Light of the 2010 Amendments, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 991, 991 (2017).
10. Based upon 10% of $1 trillion in spending. See supra note 5.
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B. The Need for Whistleblowers
The Civil Fraud Section of the Department of Justice (DOJ) is charged
with recovering federal funds lost to fraud. To determine its effectiveness, the
DOJ keeps track of statistics, including federal healthcare fraud recoveries
each year.11 In 2018, the DOJ recovered $2.5 billion in healthcare fraud
cases.12 Over the last ten years, the DOJ recouped $24.4 billion in healthcare
fraud cases.13
The government also keeps track of the role and success of whistleblowers
in these fraud recoveries. Of the $24.4 billion collected in the last 10 years,
$21.9 billion was the result of qui tam cases filed by whistleblowers, which
amounted to 90% of Medicare fraud recoveries stemming from qui tam
cases.14 The recent trend, however, shows an even greater reliance upon
whistleblowers. In the last five years (2014–2018) the rate was 92% from qui
tam cases.15 That means less than 10% of all Medicare fraud cases was brought
without the help of whistleblowers filing qui tam cases. Thus, the qui tam
provisions are the heart and soul of detecting and pursuing Medicare fraud
cases.
There is still much work ahead to keep fighting fraud against the
government. But paying rewards to whistleblowers under the qui tam
provisions is the right solution and has been working well. As explained in
later sections, the reason why the reward program is so successful is that
relators who properly file qui tam lawsuits receive between 15% and 30% of
the government’s recovery, based upon the relator’s efforts. This reward
system has made the qui tam provisions a huge success. From 1987 to 2018,
7,633 whistleblowers filed qui tam suits for reporting Medicare fraud,

11. The government keeps track of all FCA cases and recoveries, including the amount
paid to whistleblowers. The statistics are found here: Fraud Statistics—Overview, October 1,
1986 – September 30, 2018, CIVIL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (2018),
https://www.justice.gov/civil/page/file/1080696/download (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). The
DOJ statistics break out the cases and recoveries by area, such as healthcare fraud against the
government (which is largely Medicare fraud).
12. Fraud Statistics—Health and Human Services, October 1, 1986 – September 30, 2018,
DIV.,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressCIVIL
release/file/1020116/download (last visited Mar. 26, 2019).
13. Id.
14. Id. In the last ten years (2009-2018), the percentage from qui tam cases was 90% ($21.0
billion out of $24.4 billion). Id.
15. Id. In the last five years (2014-2018), the percentage from qui tam cases was 92% ($11
billion out of $12 billion). Id.
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resulting in $32 billion in total recoveries.16 Out of the total recoveries, the
DOJ paid whistleblowers rewards of $5.3 billion.17 That amounts to an
average award of $694,350 per qui tam filing ($5.3 billion divided by 7,633
filings). Here is how it works: If the government collects $10 million in a qui
tam case, the reward will be between $1.5 million (15%) and $3 million (30%).
In one instance of fraud by a large hospital chain, the DOJ recovered $641
million and paid the whistleblowers $154 million from those proceeds.18 In
that instance, the government netted $487 million (76%) in a case in which it
had no idea it was being defrauded. Not a bad return on the investment on
paying a reward.19
III. THE QUI TAM PROVISIONS
Although the FCA has been amended many times over the years, the basic
concept has remained constant: recovering fraud by “deputizing”20 private
citizens to file qui tam cases and awarding them a share in the proceeds.21
When the FCA was first enacted in 1863, Congress purposefully chose a qui
16. Supra note 12. This included both intervened and declined qui tam cases. It also
included qui tams that were dismissed without any recovery or award.
17. Id.
18. While at the DOJ, Mr. Hesch worked on this case. The settlement was for $641 million
from a single hospital chain, and the government paid the whistleblowers a combined $54
million. See Justice Department Press Release, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 10, 2003),
https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2003/November/03_civ_613.htm.
19. The government wisely gives a portion of the recovery—without a cap—because
paying large rewards deters fraud and ushers in new whistleblowers. Indeed, Congress realized
through trial and error that whistleblowers are the key to rooting out fraud against the
government. Most relators learn of the DOJ reward program from reading media reports of
mega-whistleblower awards. Many employees are still unaware that whistleblower awards
exist. But paying large qui tam awards brings about unprecedented media and public interest
in the False Claims Act. In addition, companies that might be tempted to cheat will be forced
to rethink their cost–benefit analysis. If a company believes its employees may become aware
of rewards and find the right incentive to blow the whistle based on receiving a larger award,
the cost of defrauding the government will go up, and the benefit will go down. In short, larger
rewards are the best way for the government to recover funds lost to fraud. Finally, let’s not
forget history. When Congress tried reducing the award amount and restricting relators, fraud
rose rampantly. It was a disaster. Reducing or capping rewards didn’t work then, and it won’t
work now.
20. The FCA authorization of qui tam actions “encourag[es] ‘whistleblowers’ to act as
‘private attorneys-general’ . . . in pursuit of an important public policy.” United States ex rel.
Taxpayers Against Fraud v. Gen. Elec. Co., 41 F.3d 1032, 1042 (6th Cir.1994).
21. Joel D. Hesch, Breaking the Siege: Restoring Equity and Statutory Intent to the Process
of Determining Qui Tam Relator Awards Under the False Claims Act, 29 T.M. COOLEY L. REV.
217, 219 (2012) [hereinafter Hesch, Breaking the Siege].
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tam mechanism that enables private citizens, referred to as “relators,”22 to file
lawsuits on behalf of the government against fraud doers.23 In return for their
help, the FCA promised relators a share or percentage of the recovery.24
The FCA sat largely dormant from 1943 to 1986 after Congress tightened
the qui tam provisions, making them much too strict.25 In response to
increasing fraud, Congress relaxed the qui tam requirements and added antiretaliation provisions.26 As a result, the qui tam provisions have become the
government’s most effective tool for combating fraud.27
The FCA sets ranges of percentages for determining the relator’s share,
depending upon certain conditions and factors. In a standard case in which
the government intervenes, the relator receives at least a 15% but not more
than 25% share.28 If the government declines to join the suit, the relator
proceeds alone and incurs all of the litigation costs.29 In those instances, the
relator is entitled to a minimum of 25% and a maximum of 30% share.30
Today, 95% of the government’s Medicare fraud cases are qui tam cases,31
which highlights the importance of protecting relators.

22. “A ‘relator’ is one who relates the fraud action on behalf of the government.”
Hesch, supra note 3, at 112 n.6 (citing United States ex rel. Karvelas v. Melrose-Wakefield
Hosp., 360 F.3d 220, 225 (1st Cir. 2004) (“A ‘relator’ is ‘[a] party in interest who is permitted
to institute a proceeding in the name of the People or the Attorney General when the right to
sue resides solely in that official.’ [Relator, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990)].”)).
23. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10 (1986). For a detailed discussion of the history of the qui tam
provisions and changes, see Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 21, at 219–21.
24. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 10 (1986).
25. Id. at 12.
26. Id. at 13.
27. See supra note 1.
28. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2017). For a detailed discussion of how the percentage is and
should be calculated, see Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 21. The exact percent depends
“upon the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution of the
action.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) (2017).
29. Hesch, Breaking the Siege, supra note 21, at 233.
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2) (2017). The exact percentage in declined cases is based on what
“the court decides is reasonable.” Id. As the real party in interest, the government is allowed
to recommend a percentage to the court. In practice, the government and the relator negotiate
the percentage in both intervened and declined cases, but the court still must approve the
relator’s share.
31. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. The total recovery in health care cases
from 1987-2018 was $38.8 billion, of which $32 billion was from qui tam cases. See Fraud
Statistics—Overview, October 1, 1986 – September 30, 2018, supra note 11.
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A. Filing Requirements
To obtain a reward under the FCA, a relator must follow a particular
protocol.32 For instance, a whistleblower will not receive a reward simply by
informally reporting fraud against the government; rather, she must file a
detailed qui tam complaint in court.33 The relator must file the qui tam under
seal and serve it only upon specified government officials.34 In addition, the
FCA requires the relator to submit to the government a statement of material
evidence (SME) containing a “written disclosure of substantially all material
evidence and information the person possesses.”35
The qui tam complaint remains sealed for a minimum of sixty
days, during which time the government investigates the relator’s
allegation.36 Congress allowed for extensions of the seal period to give the
government sufficient time to finish its investigation of the relator’s fraud
allegations.37 It can take anywhere from three years in a typical case, to six or
eight years in large or complex fraud cases, for the government to make an
intervention decision.38 Once the investigation is complete, the government
makes a decision to either intervene or decline. If it declines, the relator may
typically proceed on behalf of the government.39
B. Anti-Retaliation Provisions
In some cases, employers have sought to silence whistleblowers through
retaliation. However, the FCA whistleblower protection provisions create a
cause of action allowing an employee to recover double damages when his

32. For a detailed discussion of the process of filing a qui tam, see Joel D. Hesch, It Takes
Time: The Need to Extend the Seal Period for Qui Tam Complaints Filed Under the False Claims
Act, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 901, 905, 912 (2015) [hereinafter Hesch, It Takes Time].
33. Id. at 905.
34. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), (2) (2017). See also Hesch, It Takes Time, supra note 32, at 912
(“Copies of the complaint are given only to the United States Department of Justice (DOJ),
including the local United States Attorney, and to the assigned judge of the district court.”)
(citation omitted). The relator may not disclose the existence of the case while it remains under
seal. Id.
35. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (2018) (emphasis added).
36. Id.
37. Hesch, It Takes Time, supra note 32 at 905.
38. Id. at 906 n.32.
39. Id. at 912. That article also details the government process of assessing the allegations
and the role of the affected government agency. Id. at 917-21. While sixty days is the minimum
allotted time for a complaint to remain under seal, the statute places no limit on how long the
case may remain under seal. Id. at 912.
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employer retaliates for reporting fraud or seeking to stop a company from
cheating the government.40 The retaliation provision, commonly referred to
as a “Section (h) claim,” protects employees from being “discharged,
demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner
discriminated against” because of steps they have taken to file or consider
filing a potential qui tam complaint or to stop the fraud.41 The right to bring
a retaliation claim under the FCA vests solely with the employee and is not
dependent upon filing a qui tam suit. An employee may file a Section (h)
claim either as part of a qui tam lawsuit or as a stand-alone suit in state or
federal court.42 Because the provision applies to efforts to stop a violation, the
employee does not need to either file or prevail on a qui tam case. It is
sufficient that the employee was seeking to curtail what she, in good faith,
believed was an FCA violation, which may include internal reporting of
fraud.43 The protection even “includes the process of investigating or
determining whether fraud occurred.”44 In short, protected activities apply
when an employee “has a good faith appreciation that he is investigating or
raising concerns regarding whether his employer is violating the FCA.”45

40. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2018). For a more complete discussion of the FCA’s antiretaliation provisions, see Joel D. Hesch, Whistleblower Rights and Protections: Critiquing
Federal Whistleblower Laws and Recommending Filling in Missing Pieces to Form a Beautiful
Patchwork Quilt, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 51, 55–63 (2011) [hereinafter Hesch, Whistleblower
Rights].
41. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(1) (2018). Courts have identified three elements for a Section (h)
claim: (1) she falls within the scope of the FCA’s protection, i.e., was an employee or other
protected class; (2) she was engaged in an activity protected by the statute; (3) she was
retaliated against; and (4) the retaliation was “because of” the protected activity. E.g., Hutchins
v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 186 (3d Cir. 2001) (restating elements of the
statute). The statute of limitations for a retaliation claim is three years. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(3)
(2018).
42. Hesch, Whistleblower Rights, supra note 40, at 62.
43. See Mackey v. Fluor Intercontinental Inc., No. 4:15-CV-01913, 2015 WL 6125984, at
*3 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (order denying motion to dismiss) (reporting of concerns about deviation
from regulations to superiors is a protected activity); Thomas v. EmCare, Inc., No. 4:14-cv00130-SEB, 2015 WL 5022284, at *4 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (order denying motion to dismiss)
(internal reporting may be a protected activity); Pencheng Si v. Laogai Research Found., 71 F.
Supp. 3d 73, 100–101 (D.D.C. 2014) (employee’s statements about improper spending create
a plausible inference that he was engaged in a protected activity) ; Dutcher v. Mid Iowa Reg’l
Hous. Auth., No. 12-CV-3081-DEO, 2014 WL 1165856, at *14–15 (N.D. Iowa 2014) (order
denying motion for summary judgment) (“There is no magic word requirement regarding
protected activity” and employee reporting that he thought something was wrong with the
way the defendant was using federal funds is a protected activity).
44. Hesch, Whistleblower Rights, supra note 40, at 59 (citation omitted).
45. Id.
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If an employee satisfies all of the elements, she is entitled to a broad array
of relief.46 For instance, if an employee was fired, she is entitled to
reinstatement.47 If she was demoted or overlooked for a promotion, she is
entitled to the same status she would have had absent the retaliation.48 If she
was damaged financially in any manner, she is entitled to “2 times the amount
of back pay, interest on the back pay, and compensation for any special
damages” flowing from the retaliation.49
IV. STRONG PUBLIC POLICY MANDATES PROTECTING EMPLOYEES
COPYING DOCUMENTS FOR USE IN FILING QUI TAM LAWSUITS
This section demonstrates why a strong public policy mandates protecting
whistleblowing employees when they copy company documents for use in
reporting fraud against the government. First, Congress enacted several laws
that form a strong public policy providing for protection of whistleblowers
reporting Medicare fraud. Second, there are two separate lines of Supreme
Court cases granting courts the power to both void contract clauses and bar
state court claims when they run counter to strong public interests.
Accordingly, courts should (1) treat confidentiality contract provisions as
unenforceable to the extent that they limit, in any manner, providing
information to the government regarding fraud against the government, and
(2) prevent state claims against whistleblowers based upon such
confidentiality provisions.
As noted, the FCA is the government’s chief tool for combating fraud
against the government.50 In addition to the FCA, another federal regulation
applies to the Medicare fraud context that strengthens the public policy
argument favoring protection of whistleblowers when reporting Medicare
fraud. Specifically, HIPAA regulations permit whistleblowers to disclose
protected health information when reporting suspected Medicare fraud to
their counsel or the government.51
Congress and agencies did not stop there. As discussed in subpart c below,
they mandated that no procurement contract can be entered into with any
company that uses any confidentiality provision chilling employees from

46. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h)(2) (2018).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. A prevailing employee is also entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees. Id.
50. See supra notes 1 and 27. The FCA applies not only to Medicare fraud, but to fraud
against every government program.
51. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
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reporting government fraud. As discussed in subpart d below, the SEC
enacted similar regulations. Because similar language does not appear in the
FCA or Medicare regulations, Medicare providers continue to include in
contracts a prohibition against disclosing company documents to anyone,
including the government. Employers wrongfully use these “gag clauses”52 to
sue employees for violating such provisions even when the employee limited
disclosure to the government in filing a qui tam complaint.53 Although
Section V urges Congress to protect relators by enacting similar laws to apply
to Medicare, this Section argues that “substantial public policy and federal
interests would be improperly impaired if whistleblowers are not exempt
from state-based legal actions by employers based upon or flowing from
filing a qui tam case.”54 Thus, even under the current laws, there exists a zone
of protection exempting relators in qui tam cases from claims relating to
copying company documents supporting Medicare fraud allegations. There
are two separate lines of Supreme Court cases establishing this protection.
First, the Court in Town of Newton v. Rumery ruled that contracts cannot
be enforced if they violate public policy.55 According to Rumery, “a promise
is unenforceable if the interest in its enforcement is outweighed in the
circumstances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the
agreement.”56 Further, when a court is asked to void a contract provision
based upon public policy, it must balance the competing public interests.57
Thus, the initial step is determining the strength of the claimed public
interest.58 The stronger the public interest, the stronger the protection.
Second, the Supreme Court in Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation
held that when “uniquely federal interests” exist, courts may create federal
common law that preempts state law and bars claims.59 The same federal
52. These types of provisions are referred to as “de facto gag clauses.” Jennifer M. Pacella,
Silencing Whistleblowers by Contract, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 261, 272 (2018).
53. See cases cited in Joel D. Hesch, The False Claims Act Creates a “Zone of Protection”
That Bars Suits Against Employees Who Report Fraud Against the Government, 62 DRAKE L.
REV. 361 (2014) [hereinafter Hesch, Zone of Protection].
54. Id. at 366.
55. Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
56. Id.
57. See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 392. See also Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at
367.
58. See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 399–401 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining the caseby-case approach of balancing public interests). See also Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note
53, at 367.
59. Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (quoting Texas Indus., Inc.
v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)). See
also Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 367.
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statutes and regulations provisions similarly classify as protecting “uniquely
federal interests” by recruiting relators to file qui tam lawsuits. In short, a
strong federal public interest flowing from qui tam provisions created a
federal common law that should bar state contract and tort claims relating to
copying company documents for use in reporting fraud against the
government to the government.
Combined, these two lines of cases provide complete protection for
whistleblowers reporting fraud against the government. Under Rumery,
confidentiality contract provisions are unenforceable to the extent that they
limit in any manner providing information to the government regarding
fraud against the government. The Boyle line of cases goes one step further
and prevents state claims against whistleblowers based upon such
confidentiality provisions when a whistleblower uses company documents to
report fraud to the government.60
The starting point for both lines of cases is examining relevant federal
statutes and regulations because “[f]ederal ‘public policy’ is typically found
in the Constitution, treaties, federal statutes and regulations, and court
cases.”61 Under the public-policy exception flowing from Rumery, most
courts correctly treat confidentiality agreements as unenforceable to the
extent they seek to prevent relators from filing qui tam cases.62 One district

60. Under Rumery, any cause of action based upon a contract provision that is void would
be foreclosed. Under Boyle, any cause of action under State common law would be similarly
foreclosed.
61. Thomas James Assocs., Inc. v. Jameson, 102 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 1996) (citations
omitted). “[W]hile violations of public policy must be determined through definite indications
in the law of the sovereignty, courts must not be timid in voiding agreements which tend to
injure the public good or contravene some established interest of society” Id. (citations
omitted).
62. See Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 387. See also United States v. Northrop
Corp., 59 F.3d 953, 961–63 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing rule in FCA case where private
agreement which provided for release of relator’s claims was held unenforceable); United
States ex rel. Ruhe v. Masimo Corp., 929 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1039 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (“[T]he strong
public policy [of the FCA] would be thwarted if [a company] could silence whistleblowers and
compel them to be complicit in potentially fraudulent conduct.”); United States ex rel. Head
v. Kane Co., 668 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (D.D.C. 2009) (“In the absence of an expression of
Congressional intent to the contrary, a private agreement is unenforceable on grounds of
public policy if its enforcement is clearly outweighed by a public policy against such terms. . .
. Enforcing a private agreement that requires a qui tam plaintiff to turn over his or her copy of
a document, which is likely to be needed as evidence at trial, to the defendant who is under
investigation would unduly frustrate the purpose of this provision.”); X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F.
Supp. 1298, 1310 n.24 (E.D. Va. 1992) (noting that a confidentiality agreement would be void
as against public policy if, when enforced, it would prevent “disclosure of evidence of a fraud
on the government”).
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court case illustrates this point by summarizing the federal common law in
this area:
[S]everal courts have recognized a public policy exception to the
enforcement of nondisclosure agreements and similar contractual
obligations related to information used in pursuit of False Claim
Act investigations. . . . Most federal courts acknowledge this public
policy exception. . . .
Courts have also noted that Congress, in passing the FCA,
contemplated the need for relators to produce and obtain
confidential corporate documents. . . .
The Seventh Circuit has similarly recognized a “broad” policy
interest in fostering employee actions under the False Claims Act.
. . . In the context of assessing a retaliation claim based on the
plaintiffs claim under the False Claims Act, the Seventh Circuit
recognized the policy importance of not discouraging
whistleblowers from undertaking investigative efforts that might
expose fraud against the government. . . . This recognition is
consistent with “the FCA's unique structure,” which some argue,
“mandates that the relator produce internal company information
as part of filing a qui tam case.”63
In the Schmushkovich case, the relator retained company documents on his
laptop computer that he used at home for job related duties.64 He used these
documents as part of filing a qui tam case.65 Upon termination of the relator’s
employment, the company had requested the return of all company
documents.66 Based upon the public policy arguments cited above, the court
did not require the relator to return any documents.67 Rather, the relator was
ordered to destroy documents not relevant to the qui tam allegations and
retain any copies he and his counsel determined were relevant.68 The only
relief the court granted to the company was requiring the relator to produce
a copy of all documents retained, which would enable the company to ask the

63. Shmushkovich v. Home Bound Healthcare, Inc., No. 12 C 2924, 2015 WL 3896947, at
*1–2 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2015) (citations omitted).
64. Id. at *1.
65. Id. at *1–3.
66. Id. at *1.
67. Id. at *3. Although the case did not specifically state the stage of the qui tam case, the
motion and ruling occurred after the complaint was unsealed. Id. at *1.
68. Id. at *3.
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court to order the return or destruction of documents that it contended were
irrelevant or privileged.69
Although this decision and many like it that allow a relator to use company
documents for reporting fraud are clearly correct, few, if any, courts have
fully acknowledged the complete scope of the strength of the public policy
argument and therefore have not consistently applied the full measure of
protection to whistleblowers reporting fraud against the government. First,
there are even stronger public policy arguments flowing from the FCA than
those stated in the Schmushkovich case. Second, the court did not address the
additional public policy interests flowing from other statutes and regulations.
Third, most courts have not considered the additional federal interests and
protections extending from the Boyle line of cases that preempts state law
claims when they conflict with federal interests.
This Article argues that the public policy protections are much stronger
than recognized in most cases because no court has yet to analyze or discuss
all of the relevant federal statutes and regulations shaping the strength of
public policy protections for whistleblowers when reporting Medicare fraud.
A. The FCA Contains Six Policy Provisions Protecting Whistleblowers
Although most courts have cited to the FCA as the basis for determining
the strength of the government’s public policy need for enlisting and
protecting whistleblowers, none have actually identified or applied all of the
protections flowing from the FCA. As outlined below, there actually are “six
key FCA provisions that together demonstrate well-defined, dominant
substantial public policy and uniquely federal interests in recruiting and
protecting relators who file qui tam actions.”70
First, the FCA expressly requires each relator to supply the government
with a statement of material evidence (SME) containing all information and
documents he possesses that support the FCA allegations, which necessarily
includes company documents within his control.71 The purpose of an SME
“is to provide the United States with enough information on alleged fraud to
be able to make a well-reasoned decision on whether it should participate in

69. Shmushkovich, No. 12 C 2924, 2015 WL 3896947, at *3. In addition, to the extent any
retained documents are privileged, the court would hold a hearing to assess the privilege or
determine if there are any actual damages or injury from retaining such privileged documents.
Id.
70. Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 369. The policy arguments are stated in
greater detail in that article. This Article summarizes these points.
71. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(b)(2) (2017).
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the filed lawsuit or allow the relator to proceed alone.”72 Accordingly, the
FCA has emphasized the need for (and expressly authorized the production
of) inside evidence of fraud from the relator, including internal company
documents, as part of filing a qui tam lawsuit.73
Second, the FCA also requires that the relator file the qui tam complaint
with the court under seal and serve the complaint and SME only upon the
Attorney General in order to allow the government time to investigate
potential crimes and civil violations of the FCA without tipping off the
defendants.74 Mandated to file lawsuits that meet Rule 9(b),75 relators must
rely upon specific evidence that often exists only in company documents.
Third, the FCA rewards only information that is not publicly available
(e.g., internal company documents), because it dismisses qui tam cases that
are based upon public information, unless the relator is also an original
source of the allegations in the qui tam action—and thus in a position to
provide useful information to the government.76 This is called the public
disclosure bar.
Fourth, the FCA provides relators sliding scale monetary incentives by
basing compensation on two criteria: (i) their contribution in litigating the
action; and (ii) their provision of inside, first-hand knowledge, with higher
rewards for inside information.77 Thus, relators who produce company
documents receive a higher relator share.
Fifth, the FCA contains an anti-retaliation provision, which allows a
relator to recover, in addition to his award for reporting fraud, double
damages plus attorney fees for any acts of retaliation.78 Suing a relator for
filing a qui tam based upon company information is the classic retaliation the
FCA is designed to defeat.
Sixth and finally, the FCA controls what remedies are available to a
defendant related to the filing of a qui tam case and specifically limits it to the
narrow instances when defendants can prove that the relator brought an
72. E.g., United States ex rel. Bagley v. TRW, Inc., 212 F.R.D. 554, 555 (C.D. Cal. 2003)
(quoting United States ex rel. Woodard v. Country View Care Ctr., 797 F.2d 888 (10th Cir.
1986)).
73. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
74. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730 (b)(2) (2017).
75. “It has been universally held that Rule 9(b) applies to a qui tam complaint.” Charis
Ann Mitchell, A Fraudulent Scheme's Particularity Under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 4 Liberty U. L. Rev. 337, 345 (2010). Courts often require a relator to specify “‘who,
what, where, when, and how’ of the alleged fraud.” Id. at 358.
76. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2017).
77. Id. at § 3730(d).
78. Id. at § 3730(h).
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action that was “clearly frivolous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for
purposes of harassment.”79
In short, two lines of Supreme Court cases not only allow employees to
provide the government with internal company documents, but protect
relators from retaliation and lawsuits. Under Rumery, these six FCA
provisions demonstrate a strong public policy that operates to void gag
clauses in contracts. Under Boyle, lawsuits themselves against relators for
using company documents as part of filing qui tam complaints are
preempted. This is because these six provisions amount to a well-defined and
substantial public interest designed to protect a uniquely federal interest, by
encouraging and protecting relators who step forward with documents to
report fraud against the government.80 By its plain language, the FCA
protects relators filing qui tam cases by necessarily including and expressly
requiring relators to produce internal company information and documents
to the DOJ to investigate the fraud, as well as the other policy interests stated
above.81
B. HIPAA Exempts Whistleblowers When Reporting Fraud
The public policy aims explicitly stated in the FCA alone would be a
sufficient basis for a public policy exception that voids confidentially
agreements and protects relators from suits relating to copying company
documents. Notwithstanding that, there is another Medicare specific
regulation that further establishes that the public policy interest is very strong
in protecting whistleblowers and permitting the use of company documents
when filing a qui tam complaint.
The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA) was enacted on August 21, 1996 to protect patient information.82
HIPAA contains a “Privacy Rule,” which protects all “individually
identifiable health information” held or transmitted by a covered entity or its
business associate, in any form or media, whether electronic, paper, or oral.
The Privacy Rule calls this information “protected health information.”83 It
includes things such as the individual’s “past, present, or future physical or

79. Id. at § 3730(d)(4). Therefore, by implication, a defendant may not bring any
alternative claims against a relator. See id. at § 3730(d)(4).
80. Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 382.
81. Id.
82. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
83. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019).
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mental health or condition.”84 It also covers a patient’s name, address, birth
date, and Social Security Number.85
It would be nearly impossible for a whistleblower to report Medicare fraud
without disclosing protected health information, such as reporting incorrect
billing based upon the diagnosis of patients, without identifying the patient
or the diagnosis. Therefore, the law recognizes an important exemption. A
person doesn’t violate HIPAA for copying and giving protected health
information to an attorney for help in reporting fraud, applying for a DOJ
reward, or giving the information directly to the government as part of
reporting suspected Medicare fraud. Specifically, the whistleblower
exemption in HIPAA states:
(1) Disclosures by whistleblowers. A covered entity is not
considered to have violated the requirements of this subpart if a
member of its workforce or a business associate discloses
protected health information, provided that:
(i) The workforce member or business associate believes in
good faith that the covered entity has engaged in conduct
that is unlawful or otherwise violates professional or clinical
standards, or that the care, services, or conditions provided
by the covered entity potentially endangers one or more
patients, workers, or the public; and
(ii) The disclosure is to:
(A) A health oversight agency or public health
authority authorized by law to investigate or otherwise
oversee the relevant conduct or conditions of the
covered entity or to an appropriate health care
accreditation organization for the purpose of reporting
the allegation of failure to meet professional standards
or misconduct by the covered entity; or
(B) An attorney retained by or on behalf of the
workforce member or business associate for the
purpose of determining the legal options of the
workforce member or business associate with regard to
the conduct described in paragraph (j)(1)(i) of this
section.86

84. Id.
85. See id.
86. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(j) (2019).
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The key point is that even with respect to the most private of information,
the federal government’s policy of reporting Medicare fraud is so strong that
HIPAA contains a specific exemption allowing whistleblowers to use health
records in the possession of employers. By specifically allowing employees to
copy and produce patient information to the government provides a clear
statement of a strong public policy; namely, that employees must be
protected when producing company internal documents as part of reporting
Medicare fraud. Because this regulation is in the Medicare context, it applies
directly to Medicare providers and their employees, and it should be used in
conjuncture with the six provisions within the FCA. Together, the FCA and
HIPAA regulations comprise a strong public policy mandating that
employers may not restrict employees from using company documents when
filing a qui tam complaint alleging Medicare fraud.
C. Procurement Law Prohibits Use of Confidentiality Agreements
Restricting Reporting Fraud
In addition to the FCA and HIPAA laws, Congress has spoken in another
context that further informs that the public policy interest is strong in
allowing employees to rely on company documents when reporting Medicare
fraud. In fact, Congress could not have made a stronger public policy
statement than it did in December 2014, by enacting a law prohibiting the
federal government from even doing business with any company that
requires employees to sign confidentiality agreements that prohibit reporting
fraud against the government. Specifically, the statute provides:
None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available by
this or any other Act may be available for a contract, grant, or
cooperative agreement with an entity that requires employees or
contractors of such entity seeking to report fraud, waste, or abuse
to sign internal confidentiality agreements or statements
prohibiting or otherwise restricting such employees or
cont[r]actors from lawfully reporting such waste, fraud, or
abuse to a designated investigative or law enforcement
representative of a Federal department or agency authorized to
receive such information.87

87. Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235,
128 Stat. 2130 (2014) (emphasis added).
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After notice and comment, the DOD, General Services Administration
(GSA), and National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) enacted
regulations implementing the statute. The regulations read as follows:
The Government is prohibited from using fiscal year 2015 and
subsequent fiscal year funds for a contract with an entity that
requires employees or subcontractors of such entity seeking to
report waste, fraud, or abuse to sign internal confidentiality
agreements or statements prohibiting or otherwise restricting
such employees or subcontractors from lawfully reporting such
waste, fraud, or abuse to a designated investigative or law
enforcement representative of a Federal department or agency
authorized to receive such information.88
Thus, no affected contractor may include in any policy or contract any
language that might chill employees from reporting fraud against the
government. In fact, the regulation went one step further to require any
potential contractor to affirmatively represent to the government as a
condition of being awarded a contract “that it will not require its employees
or subcontractors to sign internal confidentiality agreements or statements
prohibiting or otherwise restricting such employees or subcontractors from
lawfully reporting waste, fraud, or abuse.”89
Unlike typical government procurements, most federal healthcare
programs often use a “pay and chase”90 mechanism for delivering healthcare.
Therefore, Medicare does not fall neatly within the framework of this
procurement law. Unlike DOD contractors who sign contracts to provide
goods or services, Medicare goes about it backwards. To allow for the prompt
treatment of illnesses, the Medicare program allows providers to perform
healthcare services to the needy and to later submit request for
reimbursements.91 Arguably, however, this federal law could be interpreted
to reach Medicare providers. The statute prohibits using fiscal year funds for
a contract with an entity.92 Medicare appropriations are federal fiscal year
88. 48 C.F.R. § 3.909-1 (2019) (emphasis added). The law is continuing in nature and not
limited to 2015 funding.
89. Id. at § 3.909–2.
90. United States v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., No. CV 08-01885-BRO (AGRX), 2017 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 221777, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2017) (“This system is referred to as a ‘pay and
chase’ system because Medicare accepts claims as being true representations that the claim
qualifies for reimbursement and later follows up with the claimant if it is determined that the
claim was not reimbursable.”).
91. Id. at *2-3.
92. See supra note 88.
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funds, and each Medicare provider enters into a program contract, even
though there is not a separate contract for each service provided. In any
event, even if the law is not squarely on point, the pronouncement by
Congress is just as poignant; there is a strong objection to companies using
confidentiality type agreements to chill reporting fraud against the
government. In fact, it is so strong that the government won’t even do
business with such a company. Courts should be guided to determine federal
policy from such federal statutes and regulations,93 because they address
whistleblower protections relating to reporting fraud against the
government.
D. SEC Rules Prohibit the Use of Confidentiality Agreements Restricting
Reporting Fraud
The SEC also enacted rules that impact public policy. One particular rule
states:
No person may take any action to impede an individual from
communicating directly with the Commission staff about a
possible securities law violation, including enforcing, or
threatening to enforce, a confidentiality agreement (other than
agreements dealing with information covered by § 240.21F4(b)(4)(i) and § 240.21F-4(b)(4)(ii) of this chapter related to the
legal representation of a client) with respect to such
communications.94
Under this provision, one company was penalized $265,000 because
“restrictive language forced employees leaving the company to waive possible
whistleblower awards or risk losing their severance payments and other postemployment benefits.”95 Although the SEC rule by itself doesn’t directly
apply to most healthcare companies, it does inform the scope of the public
policy argument that contracts should not be enforced anytime an employer
seeks to dissuade employees from reporting fraud or providing the
government with proof, including by copying company documents.
Assuming that some Medicare providers are publicly traded entities, they
are already covered by this new rule. But the regulation, as written, only
speaks of reporting fraud to the SEC, and therefore does not directly apply to
93. See supra note 60-61 and accompanying text.
94. SEC Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-17
(2019).
95. Company Paying Penalty for Violating Key Whistleblower Protection Rule, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, (Aug. 10, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2016-157.html.
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a whistleblower filing a qui tam complaint. Nevertheless, this regulation
provides yet further support that there exists a strong federal public policy
against any potential chilling of whistleblowers reporting fraud.
E. Strong Public Policy Exists Allowing Employees to Copy Company
Documents When Reporting Fraud
In sum, Congress and agencies have already addressed these concerns a
multitude of times and each time clearly pronounced that entities should not
restrict employees from reporting fraud to the government. Based upon the
FCA and HIPAA alone, there exists a strong public policy in favor of
whistleblowers producing company documents to legal counsel or the
government as part of reporting suspected Medicare fraud. The public policy
argument is only further strengthened by similar pronouncements in the
procurement and SEC settings that prohibit the same contract clauses and
protect whistleblowers for reporting other fraud to the government. Thus,
courts should not only void confidentiality provisions but also dismiss any
legal claims against a whistleblower when the production of documents is
made only to legal counsel or the government as part of the process of filing
a qui tam complaint. As discussed below, due to the safeguards contained
within the framework of filing a qui tam case, this protection extends even
when not all of the documents are relevant or includes some privileged
materials.
1. Potentially Irrelevant Documents
Assuming a relator may properly use company documents when filing a
qui tam complaint, some courts have questioned whether the protection
extends to documents when a whistleblower also gathers potentially
irrelevant documents.96 Based upon Rumery, the protection should match the
strength of the public interest.97 As demonstrated, the public interest is very
strong and needs broad protection, which should not be limited to only
documents that later turn out to be relevant to the qui tam allegations.
If an employee believes that a court will second guess the level of
protection based upon what a judge might later determine to be relevant
documents, it will have the same chilling effect as the offending
confidentiality clauses. In addition, when assessing this issue, courts should
take note that the public policy interest is actually greater than stated in
existing case law because those cases did not take into account the full
strength of the government’s interest in enlisting employees to provide
96. See Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 409-15.
97. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
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company documents. Thus, courts should not blindly accept existing cases,
even those that have offered protection, because the protections were
understated. This section suggests the proper approach to address a
company’s concern that a whistleblower provided documents to the
government that later turn out to be irrelevant to the fraud allegations.
As explained earlier, the FCA requires a whistleblower to produce
documents to the government when filing a qui tam case.98 In fact, the
government may decline to take a case without documents because
documents are the heart of proving fraud allegations and whistleblowers
receive increased awards when producing documents.99 The problem
whistleblowers face is determining what documents might be relevant to
proving fraud.
Unfortunately, the only federal court of appeals case addressing retaining
irrelevant (and privileged) documents involved such egregious facts that the
court upheld a claim against the purported whistleblower without even
addressing whistleblower protections flowing from public policy.100 Indeed,
the court upheld a suit against the former employee for breach of
confidentiality agreement due to a lack of a reasonable belief that the
company was defrauding the government and not due to the amount of
documents retained.101 In that case, the relator believed her employer applied
for a patent in which (she believed) the government had an ownership
interest.102 When she was about to be terminated, she randomly copied eleven
gigabytes worth of documents just in case she might want to read them103 and
rushed to file a six-page qui tam complaint without reading a single page of
those documents.104 Included were attorney–client privileged
communications, trade secrets, and a patent application subject to a secrecy
order.105 In addition, there were “numerous discovery abuses” during
litigation, including attaching privileged documents to the amended
complaint.106 Finally, the relator ultimately admitted she had no evidence in
98. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
100. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir. 2011). This case was
analyzed in greater depth in Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 410-413.
101. Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1057–58, 1060 n.12.
102. Id. at 1053.
103. United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., No. CV-06-01381 PHX
NVW, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66740, at *5 (D. Ariz. Jun. 21, 2009), aff’d, 637 F.3d 1047 (9th
Cir. 2011).
104. Cafasso, 637 F.3d at 1052, 1062.
105. Id. at 1062.
106. Id. at 1052.
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support of her FCA claims.107 It is no wonder the relator was not afforded any
public policy exception. However, this case should not be used for the
premise that the mere volume or lack of relevancy of documents retained
diminishes the public policy exemption for copying potentially relevant
documents as part of a good faith filing of a qui tam case.
The dilemma facing whistleblowers as to what documents to copy was
summed up in a prior law review article by the author, as follows:
[L]arge quantities of documents are relevant to potential claims or
defenses even though only a small fraction of documents
produced end up being court exhibits or truly essential to proving
a case. Therefore, sanctions are rarely issued in openly litigated
cases in which overproduction is an issue, and it is even more rare
that overproduction warrants dismissal. With respect to FCA
cases, it is typical for the government and defendant to produce
hundreds of thousands, even millions, of pages of documents in
large qui tam cases.
....
Creating a rule to limit production of documents based on
ultimate relevancy or volume would be counter to the goals of the
FCA, which encourages disclosure of documents and suspected
fraud, because protection would be limited to cases in which fraud
was established. Again, documents are the heart of proving a FCA
case. Most FCA cases involve many thousands of pages of
documents, with many large cases topping a million pages of
documents. There are often hundreds, if not thousands, of
individual false claims in many qui tam cases, each of which must
be established by sufficient evidence. In addition, because of the
heightened pleading requirements under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure Rule 9(b), a relator must have evidence of the “‘who,
what, when, where, and how’ of the alleged fraud.” To do so, a
relator usually gathers and produces a significant amount of
documents to support FCA allegations and survive a motion to
dismiss.108
Thus, the evils of overproduction are overstated because bad faith filings of
qui tam complaints are never protected by public policy, and good faith

107. Id.
108. Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 410, 415 (citations omitted).
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filings have several layers of protections. Even if a large quantity of
documents is ultimately decided to have been irrelevant, there is no real
harm. First, a good faith whistleblower is producing only those documents
that she had access to in the normal course of her duties. In fact, even if she
did not turn over any documents, she could still provide the same
“information” to the government as contained in the documents without
violating the company’s gag clause restricting the disclosure of company
documents. Of course, not everyone has a photographic memory, which is
why the FCA encourages whistleblowers to turn over documents when filing
qui tam cases. But the point is that the information produced in good faith
filings of qui tam cases is not protected from disclosure and should not be
shielded through gag clauses. Second, the government can obtain the exact
same documents in discovery, further establishing a lack of any real harm.
Courts have recognized that “it would be inefficient and a waste of resources
to have the plaintiff return the ‘misappropriated documents’ only to then
have them produced in discovery.”109
In addition, it is unjustified to expect a lay person to determine by herself
the relevancy of documents. As stated in the author’s previous article,
Moreover, the whistleblowing employee should not be required to
know the relevancy rules or determine which documents may be
legally significant in supporting allegations of suspected fraud or
violations of the FCA. In addition, a relator should not be forced
to review every page of every document sitting on his or her office
desk before providing them to counsel. Indeed, the relator should
not be required to read every page of every file before copying a
folder that likely contains relevant information. Not only would
this waste company time and resources, but it would also tip off
the defendant that the employee intended to report fraud, which
is contrary to the purpose and provisions of the FCA.
. . . . The relator should be able to use the attorney's professional
judgment to determine a document's relevancy. It makes little
sense to place the responsibility solely on the whistleblower, who
109. E.g., United States ex rel. Gohil v. Sanofi U.S. Servs. Inc., No. CV 02-2964, 2016 WL
9185141, at n.3 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 2016) (citing X Corp. v. Doe, 805 F. Supp. 1298, 1311-12
(E.D. Va. 1992)) (“denying request for return of misappropriated corporate documents
because would be inefficient and no irreparable harm possible under the parameters of
discovery disclosure”); Shmushkovich v. Home Bound Healthcare, Inc., No. 12 C 2924, 2015
WL 3896947, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 23, 2015) (“[C]ourts, however, have recognized the
inefficiency of ordering return of documents that formed the basis of a relator's claims and
that will inevitably be recovered in discovery.” (citations omitted)).
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may, as a consequence, spend valuable company time combing
through voluminous records to develop the case. Rather, relators
should be permitted to gather and disclose all potentially relevant
files that they have reasonable access to as part of their duties to
their attorney, who then decides which particular documents to
produce to the DOJ.110
Indeed, as aptly stated by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, “Congress
intended to protect employees from retaliation while they are collecting
information about a possible fraud, before they have put all the pieces of the
puzzle together.”111 Generally, the only way for a whistleblower to put the
pieces of the puzzle together is to hire legal counsel. Thus, it is entirely
permissible for a whistleblower to produce to legal counsel all potentially
relevant documents and obtain assistance in sifting through documents and
determining actual relevancy. There is no real harm in having legal counsel
review large quantities of documents to determine relevancy. That is
precisely what happens in all forms of litigation on a daily basis. Again, the
whistleblower is reviewing only those documents she had access to as part of
her employment. She is simply asking legal counsel to help review them to
determine relevancy. To expect a whistleblower to journey alone in reporting
her employer is unfair and would defeat the purpose of encouraging
whistleblowers to step forward.
Finally, the protection applies only when the documents are provided to
legal counsel for assistance in evaluating fraud allegations and then turning
over any such documents to the government. It does not extend to a
whistleblower producing company documents to third parties. The process
of allowing counsel to have access to files that may contain relevant
information serves an important public policy while also protecting the rights
of the company to weed out irrelevant or privileged documents when
submitting the FCA’s required statement of material evidence to the
government.
Several recent cases have understood and properly applied these points.
As discussed earlier, one court allowed a former employee to retain his
computer hard drive and to produce relevant documents to the government
as part of filing a qui tam case and was simply ordered to destroy any
irrelevant documents.112 In doing so, the employee was allowed the assistance
of legal counsel when determining relevancy. In another case, when
110. Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 415-16 (citations omitted).
111. Fanslow v. Chicago Mfg. Ctr, Inc., 384 F.3d 469, 481 (7th Cir. 2004).
112. Shmushkovich v. Home Bound Healthcare, Inc., No. 12 C 2924, 2015 WL 3896947, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 2015). See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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dismissing counterclaims related to the production of documents to the
government, the court noted that both federal and state law “recognize a
public policy that protects whistleblowers from retaliation for actions they
take in investigating and reporting fraud to the government” and that there
exists a “strong policy of protecting whistleblowers who report fraud against
the government.”113 The court also endorsed allowing legal counsel to aid in
determining the scope of relevancy and deciding what documents to produce
to the government when filing a qui tam case. According to the court,
It is unrealistic to impose on a relator the burden of knowing
precisely how much information to provide the government when
reporting a claim of fraud, with the penalty for providing what in
hindsight the defendant views as more than was needed to be
exposure to a claim for damages. Given the strong public policy
encouraging persons to report claims of fraud on the government,
more is required before subjecting relators to damages claims that
could chill their willingness to report suspected fraud.114
In short, overproduction of documents that an employee had authorized
access to is not a reason to avoid the strong public policy protections for an
employee when producing documents to the government. Again, the
protection only applies when the documents are produced to counsel in
contemplation of reporting fraud and to the government as part of filing a
qui tam complaint. It also applies only to documents the employee had access
to as part of her duties. Thus, there is no harm that confidential documents
are used for any other purpose than reporting fraud against the government.
Indeed, allowing a whistleblower to provide access to all potentially relevant
documents to legal counsel is not only prudent but a good way of refining
fraud allegations and ultimately producing to the government those
documents that are most likely to be germane to the government’s evaluation
of the fraud allegations.
2. Potentially Privileged Documents
This subsection addresses whether the zone of protection applies when
privileged documents are turned over to legal counsel or the DOJ as part of
the relator’s required SME. Again, the FCA mandates that a relator produce
copies of all potentially relevant documents in support of allegations

113. United States ex rel. Ciezynski v. Lifewatch Servs., Inc., WL 2771798, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
May 13, 2016).
114. Id. at *5.
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contained in a qui tam complaint.115 Thus, relators will be producing
documents to the DOJ attorneys assigned to investigate the qui tam
allegations. The question is how to balance the very strong public policy
interest in producing documents with the danger that some documents
might be privileged. This subsection guides the courts in this area.
Mistakes happen, and privileged documents have been known to have
been inadvertently produced to opposing counsel during all forms of
litigation. The same mistakes can happen when a whistleblower turns over
documents to his counsel or the government as part of filing a qui tam
complaint. However, there are many safeguards built into the qui tam process
that reduce mistakes and lessen the impact of mistakes. In a prior law review
article, the author outlined the safeguards, as follows:
As an initial matter, the filing of a qui tam case generally requires
that a relator use the services of an attorney. One of the roles of
qui tam counsel is to screen documents for privilege before
producing them to the DOJ in the SME. Thus, the first safeguard
is that the relator's attorney, who is an officer of the court and
bound by ethical rules, will assist in flagging potentially privileged
documents and refrain from using them.
....
Moreover, the DOJ has its own protocol for addressing potentially
privileged documents, which acts as a second safeguard for FCA
defendants in qui tam cases. Specifically, the DOJ has a general
policy of appointing a “taint team” in qui tam cases when
privileged documents are proffered or produced to it. A DOJ
attorney that is not working on that qui tam case is assigned to
review potential privilege issues and ultimately decides either that
the privilege does not apply or litigates the privilege issue. Only
once it is determined that the document is not privileged will the
DOJ attorney assigned to the qui tam case be allowed to view or
use the document.116
Therefore, the mere fact that a potentially privileged document is turned over
to a whistleblower’s attorney or contained within production to the
government does not erase the zone of protection afforded to whistleblowers.
It can be extremely difficult for a whistleblower to know if a document is

115. Supra notes 71-75.
116. Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 407-08.
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privileged, especially since many companies routinely copy attorneys on
business documents, and there exist exceptions to the privilege, such as the
crime-fraud exception.117 In fact, courts typically address the scope of
privilege on a case-by-case basis.118 Thus, a whistleblower needs the assistance
of legal counsel when assessing both the relevancy and potential privilege of
documents. That helps explain why the law requires a whistleblower to not
only produce relevant documents to the government as part of the SME, but
also hire legal counsel to file the qui tam case.119
Because of the safeguards built into the qui tam process, the risk of any
actual harm from a relator inadvertently turning over potentially privileged
documents to her counsel is minimal. In addition, any actual damage is
reduced to almost zero because the DOJ will not rely upon any privileged
documents produced by a relator due to the taint team protocols identified
above. Thus, the government attorneys handling the qui tam case will not
actually see any privileged documents that might be supplied by the relator.
In short, the fear of actualized harm related to the production of privileged
documents in a qui tam case is overstated in all but instances of bad faith,
which is outside of the scope of protection. Accordingly, unless the relator
produced privileged documents to third parties, he remains within the zone
of protection from claims for reporting fraud to the government, even if some
privileged documents are inadvertently produced to the government.
In sum, not only is copying company documents to give to the
government exempt from HIPAA and encouraged by the FCA and other
federal statutes, the public policy exemptions from Rumery and Boyle each
independently void contract clauses and bar a company from bringing a suit
against an employee for providing legal counsel or the government with
company documents.120 Thus, the combination of the FCA and other statutes
provides a “zone of protection, which includes a privilege against
117. Id. at 404-05 (“[A]t times it can be especially difficult for a relator to determine if a
privilege applies or whether the crime-fraud exception erases the privilege”).
118. Id. at 405 (“Indeed, the issue of the existence of a privilege (or any exception) is
determined by a court on a case-by-case basis, and even attorneys often mistakenly produce
privileged documents during litigation.”).
119. Courts uniformly dismiss qui tam cases filed pro se. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Mergent
Servs. v. Flaherty, 540 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2008); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 873–874 (11th
Cir. 2008); U.S. ex rel. Brooks v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 237 Fed. Appx. 802 (4th Cir. 2007);
Stoner v. Santa Clara City. Office of Educ., 502 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 2007).
120. See Hesch, Zone of Protection, supra note 53, at 366 (“The FCA establishes both a
substantial public policy interest and a need for protections required by the uniquely federal
interests in protecting whistleblowers reporting suspected fraud against the government or
filing qui tam cases under the FCA, including when they use internal company documents to
support their allegations.”).
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counterclaims relating to producing internal company information or
documents to the government, as long as the employee possessed a
reasonable belief that the suspected fraud or FCA violations occurred or are
occurring.”121 In addition, the zone of protection applies to the production of
potentially irrelevant documents and potentially privileged information.122
Therefore, courts should void any contract provision that restricts employees
from providing documents to the government (or counsel in anticipation of
filing a qui tam lawsuit) when reporting fraud against the government.
V. LEGISLATIVE FIXES
Because employers continue to include in employment handbooks and
agreements restrictions on retaining or disclosing company documents,
which are seemingly broad enough to include for use in reporting Medicare
fraud, Congress should amend the FCA to render such contract provisions
void and enable the government to sanction companies that have offending
contract provisions. This is similar to existing SEC rules. In addition,
Congress should vest the DOJ with authority to fine or sanction offenders.
Congress should also require that, as a condition of participating in
Medicare, providers will affirmatively represent that they have not included
in any handbook, policy, contract, or severance agreement any restrictions
on using company documents when reporting Medicare fraud. This is similar
to existing DOD regulations. It’s time that the FCA and Medicare
participation rules be amended to clearly provide the legislative protections
already existing for whistleblowers reporting DOD fraud and SEC violations.
Modeled after the 2014 procurement law and other relevant regulations
discussed above, Congress should amend the FCA to further clarify the
strong public policy of allowing employees to provide company documents
to the government. Here is a proposed amendment to the FCA:
121. Id. at 430-31.
122. Id. at 404–05
When relators fall within the FCA's zone of protection, it immunizes or exempts
them from all tort and contract claims that are bound up with or flow from
reporting fraud or filing a qui tam case, which includes the activities of producing
documents to the DOJ regardless of whether some of the documents turn out to
be privileged or contain a trade secret. Nevertheless, whistleblowers should not
intentionally provide documents to the government that are protected by the
attorney-client privilege. However, at times it can be especially difficult for a
relator to determine if a privilege applies or whether the crime-fraud exception
erases the privilege.
Id. (explaining the scope of protection pertaining to privileged documents). Id. at 410-11
(explaining the scope of protection pertaining to irrelevant documents).
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No person may receive payment under any government program
if such person asks any employee or former employee to sign or
agree to confidentiality agreements or statements prohibiting or
otherwise restricting such employee or former employee from
using company documents obtained within the scope of
employment for use in (1) filing a qui tam complaint, (2)
providing to an attorney retained to consider whether to file a qui
tam complaint, or (3) reporting suspected fraud directly to the
government. Any agreement that acts to prohibit or restrict an
employee or former employee in one of these ways violates a
strong public policy and should be treated as void. In addition, the
Department of Justice is vested with authority to seek a civil
penalty in the amount designated under this Act for each
agreement signed by each employee or former employee that
violates this provision.
In addition, Congress should also enact a law mandating that, as a
condition of participating in the Medicare program (or other government
healthcare programs),123 all providers must represent that they will not
restrict employees from providing documents to the government when
reporting Medicare fraud. Here is a proposed law:
In order for a provider or supplier to participate in and receive
payment from the Medicare program or other federal healthcare
programs, it must represent that it will not ask an employee or
former employee to sign confidentiality agreements or statements
prohibiting or otherwise restricting any employee or former
employee from using company documents (1) for reporting
suspected fraud to government officials, (2) for the use in filing a
qui tam complaint under the False Claims Act, or (3) for seeking
assistance of an attorney retained by a potential whistleblower for
the purpose of considering reporting suspected fraud.
VI. CONCLUSION
The qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act have become the
government’s most powerful tool in combating rising fraud under the
Medicare program. This Article argued that employees are shielded by a
strong public policy flowing from the FCA, HIPAA, and other federal
123. The law should apply to Medicare, Medicaid, and all other government healthcare
programs, such as Amerigroup, TRICARE/CHAMPUS, Blue Cross/Blue Shield—CHIP, and
Veterans Administration (VA).
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statutes and regulations from claims related to producing company
documents to legal counsel or the government as part of considering filing a
qui tam lawsuit. Thus, courts should find that any agreement that acts to
prohibit or restrict an employee or former employee from filing a qui tam
complaint or using documents in support of filing a qui tam complaint
violates a strong public policy and should be treated as void. Similarly, any
claim against an employee or former employee related to using documents
to file a qui tam complaint should be dismissed. Finally, to ensure these goals
are fully met, Congress should amend both the FCA and the conditions of
participation in the Medicare program to prevent companies from asking
employees to sign internal confidentiality agreements or statements
prohibiting or otherwise restricting the use of company documents for filing
a qui tam complaint. When amending the FCA, Congress should vest the
Department of Justice with authority to seek a civil penalty for each
employment agreement violating these restrictions. Proposed legislative
amendments are contained in Section V.

